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Axiomatic quantum field theory is one approach to the project of merg-
ing the special theory of relativity with that of ordinary quantum mechanics.
The project begins with the postulation of a set of axioms. Axioms should
be motivated by reasonable physical principles in a way that illustrates how
a given axiom is true. Motivations are often grounded in the principles of
the parent theories: ordinary quantum mechanics or the theory of special
relativity. Amongst the set of axioms first proposed by Haag and Kastler in
1963 is the axiom of microcausality. Microcausality requires the observables
of regions at space-like separation to commute. This thesis seeks to answer
the question‘What principles from the special theory of relativity or ordinary
quantum mechanics motivate, or justify, accepting microcausality as an ax-
iom?’ The first chapter will provide the necessary background to investigate
this question and the second chapter will undertake that investigation. In
conclusion, microcausality cannot be well-motivated by individual principles
rooted in the special theory of relativity or ordinary quantum mechanics.
iii
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Doreen Fraser for her support and guidance throughout this
project. I would also like to thank my readers, Dave DeVidi and Patricia
Marino, for their insightful and helpful comments.
My fellow graduate students are also owed thanks, in particular Jim Tig-
well and Lindsey Torma whose patience and discussions greatly contributed
to the accessibility of the following arguments.
iv
Contents
List of Figures vii
List of Abbreviations viii
1 Quantum Field Theory
in a nutshell 1
1.1 Mathematics and Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.1 Operations and Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.2 Observables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 The Special Theory of Relativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 Relativistic Space-Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 The Principle of Relativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.3 The Relativity of Simultaneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Ordinary Quantum Mechanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Vectors, States and Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Non-locality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Quantum Field Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.1 Algebras and Vector Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.2 States and Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 The Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2 Finding Motivation: The Foundation for Microcausality 20
2.1 The Covariance Axiom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
v
2.3 No-Signalling and Separability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3.1 Separability and Separatedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Causal Structure, The Original Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5 Relativity of Simultaneity and Hyperplane Dependence . . . 45
2.6 Tensor Product Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55




1.1 Space-Time Diagram: Solid line shows a frame of reference on
which P and R are simultaneous, dashed line shows a frame
on which P occurs before R. The bold lines have a slope of c
and mark the forward and backwards light cones of P. . . . . 9
vii
List of Abbreviations
AQFT = Algebraic Quantum Field Theory
GR = The General Theory of Relativity
OQM = Ordinary Quantum Mechanics
QFT = Quantum Field Theory





Quantum field theory is as much an attempt to carve a connection between
two physical theories - the special theory of relativity and quantum mechan-
ics - as it is an exercise in reclassifying a physical theory in terms of a new
mathematical structure. Whether or not ordinary quantum mechanics and
the special theory of relativity can ‘peacefully coexist’ has been a point of
disagreement1. Quantum field theory aims to satisfy the physical require-
ments of both of these apparently conflicting theories. The first problem
with such a project is finding a mathematical structure to build the the-
ory upon. Ordinary quantum mechanics and the special theory of relativity
are founded upon different structures, each lacking something important for
describing the phenomena of the other.
Ordinary quantum mechanics utilizes the structure of the Hilbert space to
describe phenomena. This structure accurately picks out the relationships
between the various quantities of interest, the statistics of outcomes and
relationships between states and operators. Ordinary quantum mechanics
(OQM henceforth) describes the world in terms of interactions on a very tiny
scale. The theory of general relativity is a field theory that teaches us about
the universe at a large scale where objects can have subtle influences on the
causal shape of space-time. If we want to unite OQM with GR then the most
1For a comprehensive overview of that debate see Maudlin, 1994.
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natural step is to adapt the quantum formalism into a field theory so that it
can account for the shape and structure of space-time. Unfortunately GR is
a very complicated theory and it is unclear how one would go about making
its predictions and those of OQM consistent within the same framework.
The theory of special relativity (SR henceforth) represents a special case
of GR set in Minkowski space-time which is notable for being universally
flat. A more reasonable task, that ideally would serve as a stepping stone
to a generally relativistic quantum theory, would be to unite SR and OQM.
The hope is that this will provide a good foundation for advancing the larger
and more daunting project of creating a fully relativistic quantum theory.
One method of advancing the project of merging the special theory of
relativity and ordinary quantum mechanics is through the study of axiomatic
quantum field theory. The project begins with the postulation of a set of
axioms. The axioms of quantum field theory examined in this thesis were
presented originally as a plausible starting point for the project of axioma-
tizing quantum field theory [Haag and Kastler, 1963]. As axiom of a physical
theory the story cannot end there and they should be appropriately justi-
fied by arguments from known physical principles. Ultimately, axioms of a
physical theory should not be arbitrary, they should be true. A good mo-
tivation should establish that the proposed axiom reflects actual features of
the world.
Often such motivations are grounded in the principles of the parent
theories: ordinary quantum mechanics or the theory of special relativity.
Amongst the set of axioms first proposed by Haag and Kastler in 1963 is
the axiom now known as microcausality. Microcausality requires the observ-
ables of regions at space-like separation to commute. The goal of this thesis
is to identify the motivation behind this axiom and in particular what aspect
of the special theory of relativity or ordinary quantum mechanics provides
that foundation. This first chapter will provide the necessary background to
investigate this question and the second chapter will undertake that investi-
gation.
I do not intend this chapter to be a comprehensive overview of these
theories (OQM and SR) but instead brief, targeted summaries that get at the
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concepts key to the arguments at hand. The first section of this chapter will
lay out the interpretive landscape and important definitions, the second will
explicate the relevant features of the special theory of relativity and the third
will do the same for ordinary quantum mechanics. The fourth section will
introduce quantum field theory and the mathematical background needed to
attend to the arguments that will follow. The final section of this chapter
defines some of the axioms of quantum field theory, explicating what they
are and briefly what they each try to accomplish.
1.1 Mathematics and Interpretations
When philosophically examining physics it is important to distinguish be-
tween implications rooted in the mathematical descriptions and interpretive
descriptions of phenomena. I will make a careful effort to, where possible,
make this transparent.
The mathematical formalism can be useful for informing possible sources
of physical and interpretive tension as well as indicate unforeseen relation-
ships between quantities. However, it is important to remember that the
mathematics are, at their core, inspired by experimental results and known
relationships between quantities. Any conclusions derived solely from math-
ematical principles must be backed up by sound, physically-based, reasoning.
Before this can be done one must apply an interpretation to the formal-
ism. A vector, for instance, is a mathematical object and deciding what its
physical analog is can be just as difficult as selecting vector spaces to model
a particular system. Vectors, vector spaces and inner products are exam-
ples of what I am labelling as the mathematical formalism while position,
space-time and measurement are examples of what I consider to be physical
interpretations of the mathematics.
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1.1.1 Operations and Operators
When discussing quantum mechanics the term “operator” is deployed in equal
measure as a reference for a mathematical object and a physical process. In
the interest of keeping the implications of the math separated as much as
possible from the consequences of interpretation I will use the term ‘oper-
ator’ to refer to the mathematical object of the same name and the term
‘operation’ will be used to refer to its interpretive twin.
1.1.2 Observables
What constitutes an ‘observable’ is another interpretation-laden exercise that
is necessary if one hopes to discuss quantum mechanics. While nomenclature
is often indicative of the definition, in this case it can be misleading. Don’t
let yourself be too easily convinced that an observable is something which
is observed (or that can be observed). Such notions can lead to privileging
observation and measurement (the actions) when describing the universe.
Ruetsche classifies the observables of a theory as “the set of physical
magnitudes that the theory recognizes” [Ruetsche, 8, 2011] and that is the
definition I will be clinging to throughout. The mathematical form an ob-
servable takes within a given theory varies, but as far as I am concerned, an
observable of a theory is a physical magnitude of the theory in question.
1.2 The Special Theory of Relativity
The majority of the motivations for the microcausality axiom in quantum
field theory that will be examined have their roots in the special theory of
relativity. Prohibitions against superluminal signalling (section 2.3), separa-
bility properties (section 2.3.1), the causal structure of space-time (section
2.4) and the independence of hyperplanes of simultaneity (section 2.5) are
all motivations built upon principles of SR.
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The special theory of relativity is a special case of GR that is set in
Minkowski space-time. The curvature of Minkowski space is zero: it de-
scribes a space-time that is flat. While we know that space-time does not
necessarily have zero curvature everywhere, GR shows that space-time is
locally flat (has zero curvature in every small region of space-time). When
working with the full theory of general relativity, for any system it is always
possible to accelerate to a reference frame where locally (that is, in a small
enough region around the system) the laws of physics behave like they do
in the special theory of relativity. On a local scale, space-time looks like
Minkowski space. This provides a rough and ready motivation for spending
time uniting OQM with SR (instead of the more general and more successful
GR). The hope is that if we can understand quantum phenomena in the con-
text of special relativity than we will have, at least, a cursory understanding
of quantum phenomena (locally) in the context of general relativity.
The fundamental postulate of the theory of special relativity has to do
with the speed of light:
Law of Light
Every ray of light (in a vacuum) has the same speed, c, in all
inertial frames2 of reference. [Maudlin, 44, 1994]
No matter who you are, where you are going and which way you look, if
you measure the speed of light you will find it to be c. The speed of light
does not depend on the motion of the source nor the motion of the frame of
reference from which the speed is measured [Maudlin, 44-45].
The Law of Light also requires the speed of light to be invariant under
transformations between frames of reference. The law of light led to the
discovery of counterintuitive phenomena that occur when an object travels at
2That the frame is an inertial one is an important qualification in the special theory of
relativity that is eliminated in the general theory of relativity. For a more comprehensive
discussion of the origins and meaning of inertial frames see: DiSalle, Space and Time:
Inertial Frames [2009].
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or very near to the speed of light. Well known examples of these phenomena
are time dilation (time moves slower) and length contraction (distances are
compressed).
1.2.1 Relativistic Space-Time
Newtonian physics takes place in Gallilean space, which is quite differ-
ent from relativistic space-time. Perhaps the most obvious difference is the
treatment of ‘time’ as a dimension (and hence the informative nomencla-
ture - Gallilean space versus Minkowski space-time). Newtonian mechanics
treats time as a parameter while the theory of special relativity recognizes
that time is in fact a dimensional quantity. This difference is most visible in
the geometric construction of Newtonian space, which uses 3-vectors (x,y,z),
where Minkowski space-time invokes 4-vectors (t,x,y,z).
Gallilean space does not permit any velocity to be invariant. To re-
late quantities between different inertial frames in Newtonian mechanics we
would use the Gallilean transformation. Since no velocity is invariant in
Gallilean space, such a transformation will fail to preserve the constant speed
of light. According to the law of light, the speed of light is invariant and so
Gallilean space is not suited to describe relativistic space-time.
The Lorentz transform describes the relationship between measured quan-
tities from the perspective of different inertial frames. As is required by the
Law of Light, the speed of light remains fixed under the Lorentz transforma-
tion. When a quantity is invariant under a Lorentz transformation its value
does not depend on the frame of reference it is measured (or observed) from.
The speed of light is one such invariant quantity. The Lorentz transforma-
tion is used to relate reference frames in SR.
1.2.2 The Principle of Relativity
The principle of relativity is a vital postulate of the theory of special
relativity. Harvey Brown, in a comprehensive study of the history and inter-
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pretations of the principle of relativity, argues that it can been expressed as
a prohibition against frame dependence; all inertial frames are valid frames
from which to observe and measure an event. Furthermore, the laws of
physics, in order to be appropriately classified as laws, must be covariant un-
der transformations [Brown, 2005]. The relationships between fundamental
quantities must be preserved under coordinate transformations (translations,
rotations, etc.). In the special theory of relativity the relevant coordinate
transformation that laws must remain covariant under is the Lorentz trans-
form. Brown argues that to describe the principle of relativity in terms of
coordinate transformations is to make trivial the significance of the princi-
ple and brush aside the fact that the principle was not conceived of with
transformations in mind [Brown, 36, 2005].
Roughly, the principle of relativity requires the relations between physical
quantities to be the same whether the system is at rest or in uniform motion.
Newton’s statement of the principle of relativity is found in the Principia
as Corollary V: “The motions of bodies included in a given space are the
same among themselves, whether that space is at rest, or moves uniformly
forwards in a right line without any circular motion.” [Newton, Corollary V,
Principia. From Brown, 35, 2005].
Newton’s derivation of this principle assumes that accelerations are in-
variant and that forces and masses are velocity independent. These assump-
tions do not follow from Newton’s postulated laws nor are they justified
elsewhere in his work [Brown, 37-38, 2005]. While the principle itself is an
important (and accepted) aspect of physical theories, it was not appropri-
ately classified by Newton as a corollary.
Einstein, when he first presented the special theory of relativity, postu-
lated the principle of relativity. Not only that, but he extended the scope of
the principle to include electromagnetic phenomena [Brown, 2005]. Treating
the principle as a postulate avoids the requirement for proof, the subsequent
assumptions that Newton made in order to execute such a proof and makes
clear the status of the principle. As a postulate behind the theory, an axiom
if you will, the principle of relativity is taken to be a fundamental feature of
the physical universe that cannot be derived from other principles or axioms.
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It was reflection on the principle of relativity and a desire to generalize it
further that led Einstein to develop the general theory of relativity (or at
least to postulate general covariance) [DiSalle, 2009]. The principle, as pos-
tulated by Einstein, is: “If two coordinate systems are in uniform parallel
translational motion relative to each other, the laws according to which the
states of a physical system change do not depend on which of the two systems
these changes are related to.” [Einstein, 1905. From Brown, 74, 2005].
This has consequences for coordinate transformation laws, which the
Lorentz transformation satisfies, and thus is often conflated with a covari-
ance requirement. While covariance is one way to satisfy the principle of
relativity, the principle itself is more general, and makes no explicit refer-
ence to, coordinate transformations and covariance3.
1.2.3 The Relativity of Simultaneity
The order that two events in space-time occur in depends, in part, on the
frame of reference that you observe them from. An event contained within
the forward, Q1 (or backward, Q2) light cone of an event P will always
occur after (or before) event P regardless of reference frame. Q1 is said to
be in the absolute future of P and Q2 is said to be in the absolute past
of P. The ordering of the events P and Q1 will be invariant under Lorentz
transformation. On the other hand, events outside of P’s light cone, say
R, are not invariant with respect to P. There will exist reference frames on
which P and R occur simultaneously (the solid line frame in Figure 1), on
which P occurs before R (the dashed line frame in Figure 1) and on which
P occurs after R [Maudlin, 1994, 51-52]. When two events are simultaneous
3Maintaining the principle of relativity is important, at the very least, for ensuring that
we can approximate isolation when performing experiments in a laboratory. Assuming
that the principle of relativity is true allows experimenters to ignore a significant portion
of the universe when trying to isolate the causes of experimental results. If the principle
of relativity is false then it would be difficult to continue researching phenomena in the
manner that we do because anything, anywhere could be a possible factor contributing to
a given result. The principle of relativity, at least, lets us rule out events and objects at
space-like separation. For more on the principle of relativity see Brown, 2005 and DiSalle,
2009.
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Figure 1.1: Space-Time Diagram: Solid line shows a frame of reference on
which P and R are simultaneous, dashed line shows a frame on which P
occurs before R. The bold lines have a slope of c and mark the forward and
backwards light cones of P.
they are not contained within each other’s light cones, hence simultaneity is
relative.
Considering the principle of relativity in conjunction with the relativity
of simultaneity it is natural to conclude that events at space-like separation
must be independent. The principle of relativity tells us that there is no pre-
ferred frame of reference. The relativity of simultaneity implies that events
which occur at space-like separation do not have a fixed ordering (the order
depends on the inertial frame that you observe the events from). If events at
space-like separation were able to influence one another then the principle
of relativity would be violated because of the relativity of simultaneity. It
would be possible to choose a reference frame such that the events occurred
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in any order and if the events can influence each other then their ordering
matters. Thus, the final polarization state of the photons would depend on
the frame of reference you observed the experiment with respect to; a direct
violation of the principle of relativity.
This is not a conclusive argument since it has not been made clear in
what sense space-like separated systems are prohibited from interacting nor
the philosophical and physical limitations of these two principles. This will
be addressed in greater detail in Section 2.3 when prohibitions against ‘ac-
tion at a distance’ are evaluated as a possible motivation for microcausality
and again in Section 2.5 when the relativity of simultaneity is specifically
considered as a motivation for the axiom of microcausality.
1.3 Ordinary Quantum Mechanics
Consider ordinary quantum mechanics with the law of light and Lorentz
transformations appended. This is one way philosophers have gone about ex-
ploring the relationship between SR and OQM. Maudlin shows that, for EPR
states, different frames of reference have a non-zero probability of observing
different outcomes of experiments. This shows that quantum phenomena
can violate Lorentz covariance when one models the universe by naively at-
taching the principles of SR to OQM [Maudlin, 1994].
The goal of QFT is to uncover a way for SR and OQM to coexist.
Maudlin’s thought experiment shows that one cannot just take all the prin-
ciples of SR and all of the principles of OQM and put them together to
accomplish that goal. It is important to critically consider the implications
of each of OQM and SR and understand how they relate each other, the
structure of QFT and our broader understanding of the world.
1.3.1 Vectors, States and Operators
Quantum mechanics describes the world in terms of vectors and oper-
ators. These are mathematical concepts with accepted correlations to real
objects (i.e.. states of electrons and photons are described by vectors and
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a measurement apparatus is described by an operator). The mathematics
indicates how to calculate the vector state that will result from applying
operators to vectors. This, in turn, correlates with performing a measure-
ment on a photon and then observing the state of the photon after the
measurement. What the mechanics do not indicate is what a ‘measurement’
(described by operators) or a ‘wave function’ (a linear combination of vectors
which describes the properties of a quantum object) actually are and if these
constructs have ontological content.
1.3.2 Non-locality
Assume that we have two photons which are maximally entangled, and
we then take these photons and send them off in opposite directions and once
they are sufficiently far away from each other (so far that a signal could not
possibly travel from one to the other instantly) we perform a measurement on
one. It turns out, because of the special way that the photons were prepared,
that the outcomes of the measurements are correlated in a troubling way. A
measurement carried out on one of the two photons can instantly change the
wave function description of the other photon no matter how far apart they
are [Albert, 1994].
Thanks to Bell’s inequality and the experiments that followed its discov-
ery and confirmed that quantum phenomena necessarily violate the inequal-
ity, we know that quantum states can exhibit apparently causal correlations
in a way deemed by classical and relativistic intuitions to be ‘non-local’.
Whether or not these, Bell-type, correlations can be leveraged experimen-
tally to actually violate laws of relativity is another question4.
Non-locality will be relevant when discussing prohibitions against super-
luminal signalling as a possible motivation for microcausality.
4 See Maudlin, 1994 for a closer examination of this problem
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1.4 Quantum Field Theory
How we ought to study quantum field theory is an open question. In a
recent exchange between Doreen Fraser and David Wallace the virtues of the
two most common versions of QFT are debated. One version of QFT that
is found in physics textbooks and used by physicists utilizes renormaliza-
tion techniques to make calculations simpler. There are many variations of
this class of QFTs utilizing cut offs and distinct renormalization techniques
but they can be roughly categorized together as ‘renormalized QFT’ [Fraser,
2011]. It is this version of QFT that Wallace defends, primarily because it
is the version of QFT utilized by practicing physicists [Wallace, 2011]. The
other category of QFTs, and the one defended by Fraser, could be labelled
‘axiomatic QFT’. It replaces renormalization techniques with rigorous ax-
ioms that are first postulated and then used to construct models [Fraser,
2011].
The axiomatic model has one major flaw, “to date, no model of the ax-
ioms has been constructed for any realistic interaction in four spacetime
dimensions” [Fraser, 127, 2011]. This does not imply that no such model can
be constructed, although some - such as Wallace - argue that if a model has
not been constructed in the fifty or so years since the axiomatic program
began then it is unlikely such a model will ever be constructed. And fur-
thermore, renormalized QFTs are tied to actual models and indeed used by
experimental physicists and so are already well ahead of the AQFT program
on a practical level [Wallace 2011].
Whether or not AQFT is a better research program or one fated to fail
is not my concern here. At the very least, since AQFT is better structured
for carefully analyzing the foundations of quantum field theory, in part due
to the rigorous axiomatic underpinning and careful attention to detail that
goes into constructing models, that version of QFT will be utilized here.5
5The following section is a brief gloss over the relevant concepts and terminology that
are deployed in or have bearing on later arguments. For a comprehensive introduction
to the algebraic approach from a philosophical perspective see Ruetsche, 2011. For an
introduction from a mathematical perspective see Halvorson, 2006.
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1.4.1 Algebras and Vector Spaces
Algebras in a quantum field theory specify a set of operators over a
space-time region while a state is a linear functional defined on a particular
algebra that is both normed and positive. The algebra that the state is
defined over constrains both the set of operators that can be used on the
state (the elements of the algebra) and the space-time region over which it
is appropriate to discuss that state (the region over which the algebra is
defined). We shall use the term ‘algebra’ in a sense more restricted than the
standard mathematical one. More precisely,
Algebra: An algebra, U , over the set of complex numbers, C, is
a set of elements which is:
i. Closed under a commutative and associative operation of bi-
nary addition
ii. Closed with respect to scalar multiplication by complex num-
bers
iii. Closed with respect to a binary multiplication operation that
is associative and distributive with respect to addition, but not
necessarily commutative [Ruetsche, 74].
An important example of an algebra is B(H), the set of bounded operators
on a Hilbert space.
*-algebra: A *-algebra is an algebra, U , that is closed under an
involution, ∗ : U → U , satisfying:
(A∗)∗ = A, (A + B)∗ = A ∗ +B∗, (cA)∗ = c̄A∗,
(AB)∗ = A ∗B∗
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Where A and B are elements of the algebra U and c is a complex
number.
B(H) is also a *-algebra [Ruetsche, 75].
C*-Algebra: U is called a C*-algebra if it is a self-adjoint sub-
algebra of B(H), for some H, that is closed in H’s uniform topol-
ogy [Ruetsche, 77].
Uniform Convergence: A sequence, An, of operators on H
converges to an operatorA onH in the uniform operator topology
if and only if ‖ (An − A) ‖→ 0 as n → ∞. Where ‖ o ‖ is the
Hilbert Space operator norm. [Ruetsche, 78].
Von Neumann (or W*) algebras are similar to C*-algebras except that they
are closed in the strong operator topology instead of the uniform. That
is a stronger closure condition, so W*-algebras have more operators than
C*-algebras.
W*-Algebra: M is called a W*-algebra if it is a *-algebra of
bounded operators on some Hilbert space H, that is closed in
H’s strong operator topology [Ruetsche, 86].
Strong Convergence: A sequence An of operators on H con-
verges to an operator A on H in the strong operator topology if
and only if for each | ψ >∈ H :| (An −A) | ψ >|→ 0 as n→∞.
Commutant: For an algebra, D, of bounded operators on a
Hilbert space, its commutant D′ is the set of all bounded oper-
ators on the Hilbert space that commute with every element of
D. If D is an algebra, then D′ is too [Ruetsche, 86]
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Because W*-algebras are closed in the strong (and not uniform) operator
topology, it can be shown that a W*-algebra’s double commutant is itself
[Ruetsche, 87]. In fact, one can define W*-algebras by this property:
Double Commutant Theorem: A von Neumann algebraM is
a *-algebra of bounded operators such that M = M ′′ [Ruetsche,
88].
In addition to the above, the following definitions will also be relevant when
separability conditions are on the table as possible motivations for micro-
causality:
A linear map T : A→ B is unit preserving if T (I) = I, where
I is the identity of A.
A linear map is positive when X > 0 entails that T (X) > 0.
A linear map is completely positive when its natural extension,
Tn : Mn(A)→Mn(B) is positive for every n, where Mn(A) and
Mn(B) are the C* algebras of n-by-n matrices with entries from
A and B respectively [Rédei, 1440, 2010].
1.4.2 States and Representations
States in algebraic quantum field theory are defined in terms of the ob-
servable algebra that they are defined on and so are not explicitly tied to a
particular set of bounded operators on a Hilbert Space. This is in contrast
to states in ordinary quantum mechanics which are also defined on the alge-
bra of observables but are directly linked via the trace to density operators
on the Hilbert Space. Furthermore, states in QFT are not required to be
countably additive (unlike those in OQM) [Ruetsche, 90].
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State: A state on a C*-algebra U is a linear functional ω : U → C
that is normed (ω(I) = 1) and positive (ω(A ∗ A) ≥ 0 for all
A ∈ U) [Ruetsche, 89].
Representations are morphisms into the algebra of bounded Hilbert space
operators. C*-algebras admit such representations, and indeed any state on
a C*-algebra can be used to generate a special class of representation that
is particularly useful for doing QFT.
Representation (of a C*-algebra): A representation is a mor-
phism π : U → B(H) from the C*-algebra into the algebra B(H)
of bounded operators on a Hilbert space H [Ruetsche, 83].
Additionally, a representation of a C*-algebra is itself a C*-algebra [Ruetsche,
86]. A recipe to translate from a state to a concrete Hilbert space represen-
tation and back would facilitate modelling complex quantum systems (such
as systems which implement spontaneous symmetry breaking). Fortunately
there is just such a thing, the GNS representation.
GNS Representation: For any state on a C*-algebra ω ∈ U
there exists a Hilbert space, Hω, representation πω : U → Hω
and a cyclic vector |ξω〉 ∈ Hω such that, for all A ∈ U , the
expectation value the state ω assigns the algebraic element A is
duplicated by the expectation value that the cyclic vector assigns
to the Hilbert space operator π(A). (Hω, πω, |ξω〉) is called the
GNS representation [Ruetsche, 92].
1.5 The Axioms
There is more than one way to axiomatize quantum field theory. The
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approach adopted by this paper will be the same as the one used by Laura
Ruetsche in Interpreting Quantum Theories [2011]. The following axioms
were originally proposed by Haag and Kastler [1964] and later generalized
by Dimcok [1980]. Ruetsche presents seven axioms (breaking one of the
original axioms into two distinct axioms for the sake of clarity). For a more
comprehensive analysis of these axioms see Ruetsche’s book and the original
paper by Haag and Kastler.
Isotony: Where O1 and O2 are open bounded regions ofM, if
O1 ⊂ O2 then U(O1) is a sub-algebra of U(O2) [Ruetsche, 105].
The isotony axiom requires algebras associated with regions of spacetime to
preserve the inclusion relations of those regions. If one region is contained in
another then the algebras that are associated with those regions are also so
contained. Furthermore, it permits us to define a quasi local algebra U(M)
which is an algebra associated with all of spacetime and sometimes called
the global state [Ruetsche, 105].
Covariance: Where Γ is the isometry group of (M,gab), there
is a group G = {αγ , γ ∈ Γ} of automorphisms of U(M) such
that αγ(U(O)) = U(γO) for all O ⊂ M and all γ ∈ Γ [Ruetsche,
105].
The covariance axiom secures the Lorentz covariance requirement from the
special theory of relativity. Whether or not this is sufficient to satisfy all
of the requirements of the special theory of relativity remains to be seen
(and will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 2). For now it is sufficient to
establish that indeed any quantum field theory which satisfies the covariance
axiom also maintains Lorentz covariance in a way that would satisfy that
requirement of SR.
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Microcausality: If O1 and O2 are spacelike separated, ev-
ery element of U(O1) commutes with every element of U(O2)
[Ruetsche, 106].
The second chapter is devoted to isolating an appropriate motivational stance
to support this axiom. It will be useful to define spacelike separation:
Spacelike Separation: Two regions, O1 and O2, are said to be
spacelike separated when no point in O1 is connectable to any
point in O2 by a causal curve. A causal curve is a curve whose
tangent at any point is either time-like or light-like (but never
spacelike) [Ruetsche, 106].
The vacuum axiom requires the existence of a vacuum state (or zero energy
state).
Vacuum: There exists a Lorentz-invariant state ωo over the
quasi local algebra U(M) whose GNS representation is faithful,
irreducible and satisfies the spectrum condition [Ruetsche, 108].
The weak additivity axiom allows for the quasi local algebra that represents
all of spacetime to be generated from the algebra over a local region by acting
on that algebra with translations.
Weak Additivity: For every closed, bounded regionO of Minkowski
spacetimeM, the closure in the C*-norm of the algebras U(O+a)
for a ∈ R4 coincides with the quasi local algebra U(M) [Ruetsche,
108].
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Finally, the Primitive Causality axiom formalizes the notion that the past
determines the future. It invokes the domain of dependence, which Haag
and Kastler call “the causal shadow” [Haag and Kastler, 1964, 848].
Domain of Dependence (Causal Shadow): The domain of
dependence D(O) of a space-time region O ⊂ (M, gab) is the set
of points p ∈ (M, gab) such that every inextendible causal curve
through p intersects O.
Primitive Causality: If O1 ⊂ D(O2), then U(O1) ⊂ U(O2)
[Ruetsche, 107].
The final axiom, which will not be utilized in the forthcoming arguments, is
presented for completeness:
Primitivity: There exists an irreducible, faithful representation
of Um [Ruetsche, 107].
It is worth noting that the axioms are logically independent, i.e., for each
axiom there exists a model which violates only that axiom, and satisfies the
rest [Ruetsche, 109].
With the interpretive landscape detailed, the important features of ordi-
nary quantum mechanics and the special theory of relativity explained and
the necessary tools in quantum field theory presented, the next chapter will





The set of axioms originally postulated by Haag and Kastler [1964] in-
cludes one axiom that stands out as primarily concerned with the limitations
of relativistic space-time. Indeed, Halvorson refers to it as “... the main
relativistic assumption of AQFT” [Halvorson, 14, 2006]. That axiom was
originally named “local commutivity” in Haag and Kastler’s canonical paper
and has also been referred to as “Einstein causality”, “mutual commutivity”
and, the term we shall use, “microcausality”. The axiom follows:
Microcausality: Let U1 and U2 be C*-algebras defined over
space-like separated regions O1 and O2 respectively. If every
element of U1 commutes with every element of U2, then U1 and
U2 satisfy microcausality. Which is to say, if A ∈ U (O1) and
B ∈ U (O2), then AB = BA.
The labelling of this axiom as relativistically rooted could be attributed to
its use of the relativistic concept of space-like separation: a notion that only
makes sense in the context of relativistic space time structure, a structure
that is absent from ordinary quantum mechanics. The relativistic roots of
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microcausality do not end there. The requirement of mutual commutiv-
ity embodies, as will be further elaborated below, notions of compatibility,
independence, separability and co-measurability. To put it very roughly, mi-
crocausality demands that space-like separated regions are ‘causally shielded’
from one another.
In ordinary quantum mechanics causal relationships are difficult to iso-
late. Maximally entangled states apparently conspire to produce correlated
outcomes in situations where it is impossible for the states in question to com-
municate (either before or after the experiment). Explaining these causally
deviant results has been a focus of interpretive and experimental efforts in
ordinary quantum mechanics since their discovery. That microcausality im-
poses a limitation on causal behaviour that is defined in terms of space-like
separation is good reason to suspect its ultimate motivation is rooted in
relativistic requirements.
In the tradition surrounding quantum field theory, physicists and philoso-
phers working in the field often set out with an operationalist mindset. Op-
erationalism, as an interpretive stance, is a useful first step for isolating key
intuitions in play and scratching the theoretical surface. For this reason, an
understanding of the tenets of this stance will make a solid foundation for
critically examining the ideas found at the core of quantum field theory.
Operationalism is an interpretive ideal that focusses its descriptions and
definitions on measurements, operations and (in the case of quantum me-
chanics) outcomes and statistics. Roughly, operationalists focus their atten-
tion on the measurement process and treat it as the ultimate source for the
definition of concepts [Chang, 2009]. Operational interpretations are natural
when you try to attach meaning to physical terms, concepts and phenom-
ena. As we will see, operational perspectives fail to make relevant distinc-
tions between concepts that are closely related. That said, operationalist
interpretations can be helpful when identifying the intuitions at play while
interpreting a physical claim, which is a useful first step.
The operationalist insists that there is nothing ontologically interesting
that is not accessible via measurement. The operationalist does not recognize
properties which cannot be measured. An example of operationalist thinking
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can be found in Haag and Kastler’s famous paper where they first formalized
their axioms. They define a state and operation operationally: a state is
“... a statistical ensemble of systems.” and an operation is “... a physical
apparatus which may act on the systems of an ensemble during a limited
amount of time producing a transformation from an initial state to a final
state.” [Haag and Kastler, 1964]. These definitions are explicitly in terms
of measurements, operations and statistical ensembles. If this is what states
and operations are then physics can say nothing about that which has not
(or cannot) be experimented upon. Furthermore, the focus on statistical
ensembles makes it difficult to examine and make claims about individual
properties possessed by specific particles or systems. Having an idea of what
operationalism is we can now investigate what operationalism can tell us
about microcausality.
Since an algebra is the set of operators as defined over a specified region
of space-time, if the operations over one region of space-time commute with
the operations over another, then the default interpretation is that the order
that the operations are performed in does not matter. Of course, operations
are not just performed out of context, they are performed on a particular
state (at a particular time) and states are defined over algebras. When we
say that the order of the operations does not matter, then we must mean
that the order the operations are performed in on states does not matter to
the statistics that describe the possible outcomes of performing the opera-
tions on those states. Microcausality seems to be telling us that operations
performed in one region are independent of the operations performed in any
other, space-like separated, region. This is the intuitive way to express what
microcausality means physically and it is notably an operationalist inter-
pretation. To fully understand what microcausality entails it is crucial to
understand what it means for two operators or observables to commute.
In ordinary quantum mechanics, operators (which are self-adjoint ele-
ments of a Hilbert Space) represent observables. An observable is, roughly,
a physical property (such as spin or polarization) that an object (such as
an electron or photon) possesses. Commuting operators are said to describe
compatible observables, which means that the observables can be measured
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and known simultaneously. Non-commuting observables are not compat-
ible and so knowledge of one forbids knowledge of the other. Since the
formalism that describes quantum mechanics is inherently stochastic, oper-
ationalist interpretations are fixed on the statistics of experiments (instead
of particular outcomes). In operationalist terms, measuring one of a pair
of non-commuting observables alters the statistics of a measurement on the
other. If two observables do not commute then it matters in what order
they are measured. Furthermore, two non-commuting observables cannot be
simultaneously measured.
In quantum field theory, the commuting elements of an algebra are still
operators but operators in QFT are different from operators in OQM, at
the very least because in QFT operators are defined over a specific region
of space-time. The operators in OQM are not the same mathematical ob-
jects as the operators in QFT, so care must be taken when using intuitions
formed from understanding commutation relations in OQM in the context
of QFT. Like commutability in OQM, commutability in QFT entails a kind
of compatibility (more on compatibility in Section 2.4). In both OQM and
QFT commuting operators are simultaneously realizable, but simultaneity
has more intricate implications in the realm of QFT where relativistic con-
siderations play a role (more on this in Section 2.5).
More concretely, Summers established that coexistence is equivalent to
mutual commutivity [Summers, 203-204, 1990]. This result only holds for
observable which can be written in the form of the projection operator,
or basic observables. Two basic observables are said to coexist when they
admit a decomposition which isolates the properties that the observables
describe. To illustrate this, Summers uses the example of an apparatus
with two binary displays. The observables linked to each display coexist
if it is possible to write the two observables such that one represents the
first display being ignored and the other represents the second display being
ignored [Summers, 1990]. When the observables of interest are both basic
and projections then their operators commute. Of course, this classification
of coexistence is walking on the operationalist side of the fence, but (as
is often the case) it provides a useful starting point and framing for our
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intuitions.
In what follows I will attempt to isolate the motivation behind postulat-
ing microcausality as an axiom. Section 2.1 begins this task by examining
Lorentz covariance. In section 2.2 I will make explicit the relationship be-
tween microcausality and independence properties. Section 2.3 examines no-
signalling theorems, the general prohibition against superluminal signalling
and the property of separability. Section 2.4 considers the causal structure
of space-time and in section 2.5 I will look at the principle of relativity and
preferred hyperplanes. In section 2.6 I will consider a motivation that has
its roots in ordinary quantum mechanics - the use of the tensor product
structure to describe distinct systems. Finally, section 2.7 will concludes
by reviewing this survey of motivations and attempt to settle whether the
axiom of microcausality is appropriately motivated.
2.1 The Covariance Axiom
Since the Lorentz transformation can be used to derive phenomena such
as time dilation, length contraction and the relativity of simultaneity it seems
at first glance to be the primary feature of the special theory of relativity. If
one assumes Lorentz covariance then the Law of Light follows immediately.
Ruetsche argues that “... all the special theory of relativity can be taken to
demand of a theory ... is that it exhibit Lorentz covariance. And this de-
mand is met by QFTs in its scope, provided that they satisfy the Covariance
Axiom” [Ruetsche, 109]
Axiomatic quantum field theory includes the Covariance Axiom which
demands that all acceptable quantum field theories exhibit Lorentz covari-
ance [Ruetsche, 109]. Ruetsche’s argument, presented formally, follows:
P1: Quantum field theories which adhere to the covariance axiom (even if
they violate the microcausality axiom) exhibit Lorentz covariance in
the appropriate way.
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P2: All that the special theory of relativity can demand of a theory is that
it exhibits Lorentz covariance.
C: Therefore, the special theory of relativity cannot adequately motivate
microcausality as an axiom. “Microcausality ... is to demand some-
thing more of [QFTs] than mere consistency with [the special theory
of relativity]” [Ruetsche, 109].
Recall that the set of axioms considered in this paper are logically indepen-
dent (see Chapter 1.5). Which is to say, for each axiom there is at least one
model which violates only that axiom [Ruetsche, 109].
Quantum field theories which adhere to the covariance axiom satisfy
Lorentz covariance in the appropriate way. The logical independence of the
axioms and satisfactory treatment of Lorentz covariance by the covariance
axiom secure the first premise in the argument above.
The second premise is not as well grounded. That Lorentz covariance is
necessary for any theory that hopes to remain consistent with SR is certain,
that it is all that is necessary is not. Implications of the special theory of
relativity that inform our physical intuitions are not limited to the properties
of Lorentz covariance. Only some principles of SR are directly derived from
Lorentz covariance.
One could classify the implications of SR into two categories: those which
follow from Lorentz covariance and those which do not. Amongst the set of
those that do not are the principle of relativity and prohibitions against
superluminal signalling (which is in part due to the principle of relativity).
Superluminal signalling, the law of light and the relativity of simultaneity all
have broader implications than the covariance axiom reaches. If adherence to
Lorentz covariance is sufficient, as Ruetsche insists, to satisfy the demands of
SR then appeals to the relativity of simultaneity, superluminal signalling and
the law of light would be reducible to a requirement of Lorentz covariance.
They are not.
The principle of relativity is just as vital a postulate to the special theory
of relativity as the law of light. If not for the assumption of frame indepen-
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dence then the conclusions drawn from performing Lorentz transformations
on hypothetical experimental set ups would not be possible. The principle
of relativity makes it sensible to talk about observing events from different
frames of reference and enables one to justify the use of the Lorentz trans-
formation in the first place. The principle of relativity stands apart from
Lorentz covariance, at the very least because it is an independent postulate
of the theory and not derivable from other laws and axioms.
The law of light, while not logically independent from Lorentz covari-
ance, still stands apart. While it is true that if one assumes the Lorentz
transformation is correct that the constant speed of light immediately fol-
lows, the Law of Light is the fundamental postulate of the special theory
of relativity and not a physical consequence of the requirement of Lorentz
covariance. The form of the Lorentz transformation (which explicitly invokes
the constant c) is informed by the Law of Light. Furthermore, if we look
ahead to SRs successor, the Law of Light persists in the general theory of
relativity while the Lorentz transformation is reduced to a special case. GR
institutes general covariance in place of mere-Lorentz covariance. This alone
is reason to privilege securing the Law of Light specifically, even in a system
that already satisfies Lorentz covariance.
Superluminal signalling, the relativity of simultaneity and the law of
light have something valuable to say about the way the universe works (or
appears to work). As the next few sections will illustrate, even with the
covariance axiom in place, there are many questions that arise within the
context of QFTs that revolve around these properties and principles. If it
is not already, it will become clear that Lorentz covariance is not “... all
the special theory of relativity can be taken to demand of a theory set in
Minkowski spacetime...” [Ruetsche, 109].
The one thing we can take away from this overview of the covariance
axiom is that reliance on Lorentz covariance alone in order to motivate any
other axiom of quantum field theory will fall flat. The Covariance axiom
assures us that we have all that we could ever want to do with Lorentz co-
variance. Since the axioms are logically independent then the rest of them
must stand on physical principles and requirements that are not Lorentz co-
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variance. On the other hand, the special theory of relativity plays a larger
role in describing the universe than Lorentz covariance captures. Relativis-
tically based axioms beyond covariance are required to ensure that all of the
physical demands of SR are appropriately satisfied by a given QFT.
2.2 Independence
Roughly speaking, operations which are independent are co-possible. Op-
erationally, two observables are independent when they can be measured
simultaneously. There are, at least, three categories of independence prop-
erties, two of which are clearly distinct from microcausality.
In Stephen Summers’ survey of independence properties he defines three
categories of independence. The first is statistical independence and will be
defined as C* and W*-independence below. The second, causal (or local)
independence, requires observables defined over space-like separated regions
to be independent in some appropriate sense [Summers, 1990]. Finally, kine-
matic independence is a stronger formulation of local independence that is
restricted to C*-algebras and requires that “... two observables which are
represented by elements of a C*-algebra must commute” [Summers, 202].
Summers later describes local independence as the requirement of kinematic
independence for spacelike separated observables [Summers, 1990].
Statistical independence captures the notion of preparation indepen-
dence. Summers writes that, “... two quantum systems are statistically
independent if each can be prepared in any state, how ever the other system
has been prepared” [Summers, 202]. Kinematic independence requires two
observables that are represented by elements of C*-algebras to commute. Op-
erationally, this occurs when two observables are co-measurable. Note that
statistical independence has to do with preparing states while kinematic in-
dependence has to do with measurement. It is not clear what the distinction
between measurement processes and preparation processes amounts to, but
as we will see these concepts are indeed distinct.
Summers defines local independence as: “...two observables associated
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with measurements in regions of spacetime that are spacelike separated from
each other must be independent of each other in an appropriate sense, since
no causal influences can propagate faster than the speed of light” [Summers,
1990, 202]. Microcausality is one way of enforcing this sense of independence,
but the motivation here is based upon superluminal signalling. Summers also
notes that the axiom of microcausality does not capture fully “... the physical
notion of causal independence,” [Summers, 202] and that the collection of
physically motivated axioms for QFTs together result “... in a degree of
independence for the local spacelike separated algebras of observables that
goes well beyond [the] minimal requirement of kinematical independence”
[Summers, 202]1.
This section will focus on statistical independence. In section 2.3 I will
address superluminal signalling in detail. Kinematic independence will re-
turn in section 2.6 when I discuss a motivation from ordinary quantum me-
chanics.
Before discussing formalizations of independence a couple of notational
definitions are in order:
Definition ∧: If e,f are projection operators on a Hilbert space
H, then e ∧ f denote the projection onto the closed subspace
e(H) ∩ f(H) [Halvorson, 26, 2006].
Definition ∨: If A, B are C*-subalgebras of some C*-algebra C,
then A∨B denotes the C*-algebra generated by A∪B [Halvorson,
26, 2006].
Formally the three notions of independence that I would like to examine, in
no particular order, are:
1In the interest of brevity, this paper will not address the axiom of microcausality in
conjunction with the rest of the axioms. While there are interesting results to be explored,
that may be relevant to motivating (or demotivating) microcausality; the goal here is to
merely consider microcausality on its own.
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Schlieder Property: Let R1 and R2 be von Neumann Alge-
bras acting on a Hilbert space H. The set (R1, R2) satisfies
the Schlieder Property if for all non-zero projections e ∈ R1 and
f ∈ R2 then e ∧ f 6= 0 [Halvorson, 26, 2006].
If you can see how “∧” is analogous to conjunction in classical logic, then
the Schlieder Property is analogous to logical independence [Halvorson, 26,
2006]. The Schlieder Property represents the ‘logical’ independence of two
algebras in themselves and in particular the relations that hold between sets
composed of elements of those two algebras.
The following formalizations of independence are specifically about the
relationships between states. Already motivating microcausality via statis-
tical independence is suspect, since microcausality has to do with operators
and statistical independence has to do with states. What follows are formal
definitions for Summers’ statistical independence:
C*-Independence: Let A and B be C*-algebras. The set (A,B)
is said to be C*-independent when, for any state w1 ∈ A and any
state w2 ∈ B, there exists a state w ∈ A∨B such that w |A= w1
and w |B= w2 [Halvorson, 26, 2006].
Halvorson immediately notes, after defining C*-independence, that it has an
obvious operationalist motivation. This kind of independence embodies the
idea that an observer in region A’s choice to prepare a state cannot impact
an observer in region B’s ability to prepare a state [Halvorson, 26, 2006].
Halvorson also notes that C*-independence could alternatively be regarded
as an explication of the independence of objects. Which is to say, two ob-
jects are independent only when any state of one is compatible with any
possible state of the other. This is the case if they satisfy C*-independence
[Halvorson, 27, 2006].
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W*-Independence: Let R1 and R2 be von Neumann algebras
acting on a Hilbert space H. The pair (R1, R2) is said to be W*-
independent when, for every normal state ψ1 ∈ R1 and every
normal state ψ2 ∈ R2, there exists a normal state ψ ∈ R1 ∨ R2
such that ψ |R1= ψ1 and ψ |R2= ψ2 [Halvorson, 28, 2006].
A normal state on a von-Neumann algebra is an ultraweakly continuous state
[Halvorson, 2006, 6].
Like C*-independence, operationally speaking, W*-independence expresses
the notion that the preparation of normal states does not impact one’s ability
to prepare other normal states on another von Neumann algebra.
C* and W*-independence are identical in form but expressed relative to
different algebraic structures. Recall that a representation of a C*-algebra
is a morphism from that algebra to B(H), the set of bounded operators on
a Hilbert space H. One way to obtain a von Neumann algebra is to take
a representation of a C*-algebra and close it in strong operator topology
of its Hilbert space [Ruetsche, 86, 2011]. A von Neumann algebra is a *-
algebra that satisfies a stronger closure property than a C*-algebra and so
it contains more operators than a C*-algebra. The similarity of C* and W*-
independence should come as no surprise since Summers classifies both as
statistical independence [Summers, 1990].
Microcausality is closely related to the properties of statistical and log-
ical independence. If any of these properties implied microcausality then
the features of those properties would help illuminate the physical implica-
tions of microcausality. If microcausality implied any of the independence
properties then, if the properties so implied are appropriately desirable (they
accurately describe observed relations between physical systems) we might
find motivation for the axiom here. Unfortunately implication does not link
microcausality and these independence properties.
Halvorson shows that C*-independence does not imply microcausality
[Halvorson, 27]. From Summers we know that if you assume local commu-
tivity (i.e. microcausality) then W*-independence implies C*-independence.
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Furthermore, when microcausality is assumed, C*-independence and the
Schlieder Property imply each other [Summers, 1990]. Summers discussion
of these properties and their relations reveals that W*-independence and mi-
crocausality are themselves independent. Likewise for C*-independence and
the Schlieder Property. Microcausality greases the pathway connecting the
formalizations of statistical independence, but is not implied by nor does it
imply any of these three properties. Without microcausality the relationships
connecting independence properties are not maintained. Microcausality does
not entail nor is it entailed by any of these properties.
Here we may have found a possible motivation for postulating micro-
causality. When microcausality obtains W*-independence implies C*-independence
and statistical independence and the Schlieder Property are equivalent. With-
out microcausality these relationships do not obtain. Thus, we ought to have
microcausality as an axiom because it entails these connections between sim-
ilar properties.
This fails to adequately motivate postulating microcausality as an ax-
iom because appropriate motivations are not grounded in how we would like
things to be, or how nice things work out when they obtain. A good motiva-
tion should establish that the proposed axiom accurately reflects how things
actually are and should include some kind of physically based argument.
That microcausality has nice (simplifying) implications is not enough to jus-
tify its status as an axiom. Such a motivation is essentially mathematical,
and not appropriate for (solely) supporting a physical axiom. Additional
evidence is required to show that the physical notions that these properties
capture are actually related in the way that microcausality entails that they
are.
At their foundation independence properties are a classification tool used
to assess what kinds of relations hold between states and the measurements
performed on arbitrary systems in arbitrary regions. Microcausality is a
postulated rule which applies universally to all systems that fall under its
scope. It is only natural for a law to impact categories, especially categories
which are similar in scope to that law. If implications of an axiom fail to
reflect reality then you have found grounds to challenge the postulation of
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the axiom. It requires more, however, than nice implications for an axiom
to earn its stripes.
That microcausality implies logical relationships between statistical and
logical independence properties is only grounds for accepting the axiom if
those relationships obtain in reality. Until that is confirmed, that it implies
those relationships merely expands the territory one might explore if you
desire to reject the axiom. All you need to do is find a single physical example
that violates the relationships that microcausality entails and the axiom
would be eliminated (assuming, of course, that the independence properties
in question access actual features of the world).
Returning to operationalism for a moment, statistical independence re-
lations can be expressed in terms of limitations (or lack thereof) on state
preparation. The operational interpretation of microcausality invokes the
notion of co-measurability or co-realizability, not co-preparation. Micro-
causality is not in the business of securing independence of preparing states
(perhaps obviously, since microcausality does not explicitly invoke states).
On the other hand, while still wearing our operationalist hats, it is difficult
to express the difference between a measurement and a preparation proce-
dure. Operationally speaking they are the same; the process by which you
measure a state and the process by which you prepare a state are identical.
Here we find evidence that operationalist interpretations are not well suited
for parsing the fine grained relationships between clearly distinct notions.
It is obvious that there is a difference between independence of preparation
and independence of measurement.
Microcausality is operationally interpreted as co-measurability and sta-
tistical independence is operationally interpreted as the freedom to prepare
states in any order. However, the previous discussion showed that micro-
causality does not imply statistical independence and neither does statisti-
cal independence imply microcausality. Thus, independence of measurability
does not imply independence of preparation and vise versa. The two pro-
cesses must differ in a relevant way; we have both mathematical and physical
reasons to distinguish these concepts. And yet, operationalist interpretations
fail to make this distinction.
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Notions of independence can only provide motivation for postulating mi-
crocausality if the relationships between them actually obtain in the world.
Even if they are, that microcausality entails nice relationships between prop-
erties is not particularly sturdy ground to stand an axiom on. A better
motivation would be more closely connected to the special theory of relativ-
ity or ordinary quantum mechanics. At the very least, we have found good
reason to be suspicious of operationalist interpretations. In the next sec-
tion I will examine the most commonly deployed motivation for postulating
microcausality - that it prohibits superluminal signalling.
2.3 No-Signalling and Separability
Superluminal signalling refers to a class of (forbidden) phenomena: the
process of sending a message or an interaction propagating at a speed greater
than the speed of light. The most common motivation for microcausality
makes an appeal to no-signalling results, which require the axiom of micro-
causality in order to be derived. Before deciding whether or not this will
provide a good motivational foundation for the axiom of interest, it will be
important to determine from where the prohibition against superluminal sig-
nalling arises. The obvious candidate is the special theory of relativity. After
all, it does seem to have the greatest stake in the speed of light.
The first, and perhaps most important, thing to note about the special
theory of relativity is that nowhere does it explicitly forbid anything from
traveling at superluminal speeds. All SR has to say about the speed and
light is that the speed of light is invariant, which is the content of the law
of light. However, this provides plausible grounds for the claim. Examining
the rate of change of the rest mass of a particle as it accelerates closer to the
speed of light shows that as velocity approaches c then rest mass approaches
infinity. This implies that in order to accelerate a particle beyond c one
is required to produce an infinite amount of energy since mass and energy
are proportionally related. Since producing an infinite amount of energy
is physically impossible, it follows that no particle which is found traveling
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below the speed of light can ever accelerate to or beyond the speed of light
[Maudlin, 65-71, 1994].
We are not out of the tunnel yet, as this only provides grounds for believ-
ing that c bounds the speed of the kinds of things that we are familiar with
(electrons, protons, radiation and so on) but does not block the existence
of objects which are born traveling at superluminal speeds. Particles that
travel at speeds greater than the speed of light are called tachyons. They
move through space (as we know it) like it was time and move through time
(as we know it) like it was space. Which is to say, they are - if they ex-
ist - unlike anything we have or can experience. If tachyon’s do exist the
principle of relativity can be used to assure us that they cannot be the un-
derlying cause of weird quantum correlations. If a tachyon appears to be
responsible for such a correlation there will be another frame of reference
from which the tachyon arrives too late to be causally responsible and yet
another from which the tachyon could only be responsible if it was carrying
relevant information before the experiment was even performed [Maudlin,
71-79, 1994].
We have evidence from SR that objects traveling at sub-luminal speeds
cannot accelerate to or beyond the speed of light and that objects (which
may or may not exist) traveling at superluminal speeds simply cannot be
causally responsible (without invoking odd notions of backwards causation)
for quantum correlations. And, just in case this isn’t strong enough grounds
to convince you, for the sake of argument, let’s take it to be the case that
superluminal signalling is something we want to prohibit.
Before returning our attention to the axiom of microcausality, the fol-
lowing definitions will prove useful:
Non-Selective Measurement: A measurement is called non-
selective when it does not select a particular state and instead
produces a wave function expressed by a mixed state of all possi-
ble outcomes, each weighted by their respective Born Rule prob-
ability [Ruetsche, 109, 2011]. Mathematically, a non-selective
measurement is a unit preserving, completely positive map [Rédei,
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1440, 2010]2.
The Projection Postulate: Let A be a von Neumann algebra
(acting on H). A self-adjoint operator Q that has a purely dis-
crete spectrum λi and corresponding spectral projections Pi (in
A), is described by the projection postulate operation, Tproj , if
it can be written as follows: Tproj(X) =
∑
i PiXPi ∈ A [Rédei,
2010].
A measurement is said to be represented by an operation in the projection
postulate sense if it is possible to express the operator describing the mea-
surement in the form of the projection postulate. Not all measurements can
be so expressed; there are examples of interactions within quantum systems
that cannot be described in the form of the projection postulate. A com-
mon example is when the observable in question does not have a discrete
spectrum [Rédei, 2010].
If one assumes that the microcausality axiom holds then “... measure-
ments represented by an operation in the projection postulate sense... carried
out on a system localized in space-time region V1 do not disturb a system
localized in a space-like separated space-time region V2” [Rédei, 1447, 2010].
The requirement of the projection postulate sense of measurement constrains
the set of operations that this result applies to. Specifically, only to those
measurements which can be written in the form of the projection postulate
- which excludes selective measurements.
Microcausality is a necessary assumption for deriving no-signalling re-
sults such as the one above. The accompanying defence of microcausality
proceeds as follows: microcausality has a justified place amongst the axioms
of quantum field theory because it is sufficient for prohibiting superluminal
signalling, which is forbidden by the special theory of relativity.
2Recall that a linear map T : A → B is unit preserving if T (I) = I, where I is the
identity of A. And that a linear map is positive when X > 0 entails that T (X) > 0 [Rédei,
1440, 2010].
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While it is not clear that superluminal signalling is explicitly prohib-
ited by SR, there are good reasons to assume that it is (as elaborated upon
above) and for the sake of argument we’ve assumed that it is. Ruetsche aptly
notes that there are examples of physical systems which are excluded from
no- signalling theorems. Microcausality implies no- signalling results that
are restricted to non-selective measurements. The axiom does not prohibit
selective measurements from engaging in causally bad behaviour. The class
of correlation not constrained by microcausality are referred to (in the lit-
erature on Bell’s inequality) as outcome dependent correlations. When two
systems display outcome dependence the statistics of an experiment in one
region depends on the outcome of a quantum measurement in the other. On
one hand, the outcomes of quantum measurements are stochastic events and
so the statistical dependence is beyond our control to manipulate, on the
other hand causal relations are no less causal if we cannot manipulate them
[Ruetsche, 111-112, and Maudlin 1994].
Even assuming that outcome dependence does not threaten ‘causal good
behaviour’ in QFTs, no- signalling results entailed by microcausality are
restricted in another way. Since the no- signalling theorem is restricted to
measurements which are expressed in the projection postulate sense, they not
only must be non-selective measurements but also must be measurements of
discrete observables. It turns out that QFTs are full of observables which
are accessible via non-selective operation but themselves are not discrete
[Ruetsche, 112].
Microcausality is sufficient to rule out some classes of no- signalling, in
particular, the class generated by non-selective measurements of discrete
observables, but it fails to fully prohibit all possible cases of such action.
If microcausality is to be motivated by its natural disposition to prohibit
superluminal activity, and we are inclined to take action to prohibit such
activity within our physical theory, the axiom will need to do more than
block a few cases.
If this prohibition is the sole motivation for microcausality then explicitly
prohibiting superluminal signalling would be a more effective way to secure
the desired result since microcausality on its own is not such a prohibition,
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but only one of the many parts that come together to establish the desired re-
sult. No signalling theorems are one way of formalizing a prohibition against
notions of action at a distance and if no signalling theorems are silent about
the causal relationships between certain space-like separated systems then
so too is microcausality, which is a prerequisite of those theorems. If we are
interested in prohibiting action at a distance then microcausality has proven
itself to be insufficient to do so universally.
2.3.1 Separability and Separatedness
Rédei and Valente sought to uncover the strongest no- signalling con-
dition that microcausality does secure universally. As part of that project
they defined and explored the properties of separability and separatedness.
Separatedness is, essentially, a version of the no- signalling results just dis-
cussed. Separability is a weaker condition than separatedness and is related
to notions of independence3. Separability refers to the ability to treat two
systems as different systems.
The notions of separatedness and separability are invoked in order to
investigate the question “... how local can local operations be in AQFT”
[Rédei and Valente, 2010]. They first construct a typical no- signalling result
(via operational separatedness), show that such a result is not universal (as
was established for a similar result above) and then develop the notion of
operational separability as a natural weakening of operational separatedness.
Operational separateness holds “if two subsystems of a larger quantum
system are physically (causally) independent then an interaction with one of
the subsystems that changes that subsystem’s state, is restricted to the sub-
system involved in the interaction and does not affect the other subsystem’s
state” [Rédei, 1441, 2010]. However, separateness is violated by a specific
3 When the set of operations in question are compositionally closed and include the
identity operator then C*-independence imply C*-separability. It is, however, not known
if this relationship holds in general [Rédei, 2010].
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class of operations defined on local algebras over space-like separated re-
gions4 [Rédei and Valente, 2010], which shows that operational separateness
is too strong for quantum field theory. There are examples of non-separated
local systems. Furthermore, the no- signalling result that holds for systems
which are operationally separated only applies to Kraus operators. Since
Kraus operators cannot be used to define a general operation, Rédei and
Valente show that there exists local systems which violate operational sep-
aratedness and subsequently violate the entailed no- signalling result [Rédei
and Valente, 2010].
In response to this discovery they weaken the condition of interest in
order to explore the limits of locality within QFTs. The weaker separability
condition (that is not violated in quantum field theories) is C*-separability:
(Operational) C*-Separability: The pair (A1,A2) of C*-
subalgebras of C*-algebra A is called operationally C*-separable
in A with respect to the sets of operations (T1,T2,T ) if every op-
eration T1 ∈ T1 has an extension T ∈ T which is the identity
map on A2, and every T2 ∈ T2 has an extension T ∈ T which is
the identity map on A1 [Rédei, 1443, 2010].
The weakening comes in the form of a requirement that enforces ‘causal good
behaviour’. In this case, operations are not restricted to the region that they
are local to but are such that their extension is the identity on other regions.
The additional requirement of the identity extension blocks the existence of
non-separable local systems that plagued separatedness. This is a weaken-
ing of operational separateness and so entails a weaker no- signalling result.
However, unlike standard no- signalling results, assuming microcausality en-
sures that C*-separability holds in quantum field theories generally for re-
gions which are spacelike separated [Rédei and Valente, 351, 2010]. On the
other hand, just like other no- signalling results C*-separability still fails to
4In particular, operational separateness is violated by Accardi-Cecchini type operations
defined on local algebras over space-like separated regions. See Rédei and Valente 2010
for more details.
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block superluminal signalling in a category of relevant cases.
The method of motivating microcausality on the grounds of separability
looks similar to the way no- signalling results are leveraged to the same end.
Since the assumption of microcausality entails the that all space-like sepa-
rated systems are C*-separable then, assuming C*-separability is a universal
property space-like separated systems ought to possess, we should postulate
microcausality. Phrased this way the motivation sidesteps the problems just
discussed, namely the inability to prohibit superluminal activity via selective
measurements. On the other hand, if microcausality entails that space-like
separated regions are C*-separable, then it must be the case that such sys-
tems actually are C*-separable.
Even assuming that C*-separability is a property possessed by space-
like separated systems, microcausality has no explicit stake in separability
or superluminal causation. It has to do with the fundamental relationships
between regions distinguished solely by their space-like separation. That
postulating microcausality enables no- signalling results to be derived and
properties such as C*-separability to be universalized are nice consequences,
but as was argued above for the case of independence properties, nice con-
sequences are not strong enough grounds to motivate an axiom. Such con-
sequences provide space for disconfirmation, and for the axiom to stand the
consequences of it (both mathematical and physical) must not fail to obtain
in the world.
While it is interesting and informative to unravel the precise limits of the
axiom’s ability to prohibit superluminal signalling, that the separatedness
conditions had to be restricted in such a way to enforce causally good be-
haviour is further evidence that microcausality could do better in the realm
of no- signalling results. As Ruetsche neatly puts it, “... there is room to
worry that Microcausality would be better motivated if it were demonstra-
bly sufficient to rule out a wider variety of signalling than it at present is.”
[Ruetsche, 112]. The separability results still do not solve issues of outcome
dependence (and selective measurement) nor do they extend the result to
cover discrete operations. In fact, the C*-separability results is a weakening,
not an extension, of the insufficient motivation for microcausality that is no-
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signalling.
Having established the role of microcausality relative to the theory of spe-
cial relativity in general, set up the hierarchy of some common independence
properties and grappled with the most prevalent motivation for the axiom,
we will change gears in the next section and explore the axiom’s origins in
search of a stronger foundation.
2.4 Causal Structure, The Original Motivation
Haag originally motivated the axiom as follows: “The main principle
expressed by it is the causal structure of events. Two observables associated
with space-like separated regions are compatible. The measurement of one
does not disturb the measurement of the other. The operators representing
these observables must commute.” [Haag, 107, 1992. Emphasis mine].
Compatibility is essentially rooted in notions of disturbance. Two sys-
tems can be said to be compatible if actions performed on or by one system
do not disturb the other. This notion could be identified as an indepen-
dence or separability property. Operationally, compatibility refers to co-
measurability. Two systems are compatible (in the operationalist sense) if
they are simultaneously measurable [Summers, 1990]. Given that Haag (and
Kastler) invoke operationalist accounts of states and observables it is prob-
able that their motivation for microcausality is operationally rooted.
Ruetsche attempts to develop a formal motivation on Haag’s behalf. Let
A and B represent arbitrary operations in space-like separated regions O1
and O2 respectively and |ψ〉 represent a global state (which is an element of
the quasi-local algebra U(M)).
P1: If AB |ψ〉 6= BA |ψ〉, then the form of the global state after
performing operations in O1 and O2 would depend on the order
that those operations were performed in.
P2: Since the regions are space-like separated, we know that
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there is no matter of fact about the order of the operations.
C: Therefore A and B must commute [Ruetsche, 110, 2010].
Ruetsche then proceeds to defeat this reconstruction by challenging the no-
tion of the global algebra admitting a state. That notion is in conflict with
the motivation behind the Vacuum Axiom; the idea of a measurement in or-
dinary quantum mechanics does not accommodate allowing the quasi-local
algebra U(M) to admit a state. “If |ψ〉 is [a] global state, it’s a state for all
space and all time, and the notion of changing it by an operation executed
within spacetime is nonsense.” [Ruetsche, 110]. Then |ψ〉 must not be a
state for all space and all time, so instead Ruetsche casts it as a state at a
time.
If |ψ〉 is a state at a time then it is defined on a particular hyperplane
of simultaneity Σ. In which case |ψ〉 is defined on the algebra U(Σ). The
same problem with |ψ〉 as a global state appears when one introduces the
Primitive Causality axiom5. “Primitive Causality implies that the algebra
for all of spacetime U(M) coincides with the algebra U(Σ). Any state on one
is automatically a state on the other, and so not subject to alternation by
activity within the spacetime for which it’s a state.” [Ruetsche, 110]. That
this reconstruction is disabled so quickly is one indication of its weakness.
Ruetsche has built a straw-man to defend Haag.
The use of a global state to capture the notion of compatibility was ill
fated from the outset. Haag did not have in mind the idea of measurements
on global states when he first presented the axiom. When first presenting the
principle of locality Haag and Kastler state that, “... observables in causally
disjoint regions are always compatible” [Haag and Kastler, 1964]. The focal
point of the principle is that observables in causally disjoint regions, which
are not represented by a global state (neither in ordinary quantum mechanics
nor in quantum field theories). Ruetsche was spot on when she centred
her formal reconstruction of Haag’s position in terms of local operations,
5Recall that Primitive Causality, defined in Section 1.5, essentially requires the future
events in a region to be determined solely by the events contained in its ‘causal shadow’.
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but ignoring “... more nuanced and subtle models of local operations...”
[Ruetsche, 111] was an error. The notion of local operation that Haag had
in mind is, at least, more nuanced than a global state or a global state at a
time since both of these notions invoke a global state.
Reutsche’s construction does have an upside. It clearly establishes that,
in the absence of a more nuanced sense of local operation, microcausality can-
not claim to be necessary to rule out action-at-a-distance [Ruetsche, 111].
This would open the door to discuss superluminal signalling (since micro-
causality can claim to be sufficient for such a prohibition), but we’ve already
ruled superluminal signalling out as a motivation in the previous section.
Haag’s motivation for microcausality rests upon a requirement of com-
patibility between spacelike separated systems. Haag writes that if two states
are compatible then “[t]he measurement of one does not disturb the measure-
ment of the other” [Haag, 107], and that postulating microcausality implies
that the best way to achieve that requirement is to insist upon mutual com-
mutivity between operations at space-like separation.
Mutual commutivity is not the only way to ensure that observables in
space-like separated regions are compatible with each other. Separability
and independence are examples of other formalized properties which per-
form a similar role. If compatibility between space-like separated regions is
a physical requirement, then postulating microcausality to do so needs to be
motivated. At the very least, one needs to provide reasons to adopt micro-
causality as an axiom instead of independence or separability, all of which
can be used to secure compatibility between space-like separated regions.
C* andW*-independence both express the notion that independent states
are co-measurable: they can both be measured simultaneously. Unfortu-
nately, co-measurability and non-disturbance of measurement (which Haag’s
compatibility requires) are not exactly the same properties. Furthermore,
independence is expressed in terms of states and not measurement opera-
tors and so interpretive work would need to be done to explicitly establish
how independence takes the shape of a compatibility requirement. Separa-
bility, on the other hand, is closer to Haag’s definition of compatibility as
it deals explicitly with operators and the ability to perform operations on
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states without having an impact on states in a different region.
Previously we explored these notions and found them lacking as motiva-
tion for microcausality, but those discussions do no prohibit these properties
from being postulated as a replacement for microcausality. In order to ap-
propriately universalize them they would need to be granted the same scope
as the axiom - universal application to spacelike separated regions. Once
this extension is applied each of these positions arrives at the same place we
find microcausality in now, seeking adequate physical motivation for being
postulated as an ‘axiom’. Microcausality must have some inherent value to
have been initially postulated when these other properties were not, and to
have survived as a member of this particular axiomatic program for the last
fifty years.
If Haag’s requirement for compatibility can be essentially described as
a requirement for independence or separability then the results of section
2.2 and 2.3 can be applied and the same conclusion follows: microcausality
can’t find an adequate motivation here. There must be something deeper
underwriting the axiom.
In the canonical paper where Haag and Kastler present their axioms for
QFT they open with a definition of what they take to be the principle of
locality:
“The essential feature which distinguishes quantum field theory
within the frame of general quantum physics is the principle of
locality. This principle states that it is meaningful to talk of
observables which can be measured in a specific space-time re-
gion and that observables in causally disjoint regions are always
compatible.” [Haag and Kastler, 1964].
This statement of the principle of locality contains two claims. The first is
about operations in specific spacetime regions – which implicitly assumes
that operations defined on spacetime regions can be performed in those
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spacetime regions. The second, if we assume that spacelike separated re-
gions are causally disjoint6, is a statement of microcausality. Haags’ local
commutivity axiom (which is our microcausality axiom) is embedded within
the principle of locality. And, the principle of locality is the motivating as-
sumption behind Haag and Kastler’s project. It seems like Haag and Kastler
have the axiom of microcausality already in place. It’s postulation goes with-
out motivation because it is part of the background, buried in the description
of “[t]he essential feature which distinguishing quantum field theory...” [Haag
and Kastler, 1964].
Recall that the axiom of microcausality is motivated, according to Haag,
because algebras over space-like separated regions need to be compatible.
The principle of locality asserts that observables in causally disjoint regions
are always compatible. Putting the principle of locality and axiom of micro-
causality together we see that Haag and Kastler, by not providing a detailed
physical motivation for microcausality as an axiom, are assuming that space-
like separated regions are causally disjoint. This assumption gets into trouble
when you try to sort out precisely what constitutes a causal relationship. We
know from the no- signalling discussion that there are some classes of corre-
lation (outcome dependence) that, while they cannot be manipulated, carry
many signatures of ‘causality’ and can reach across spacelike separation.
The requirement of compatibility between spacelike separated regions
was the notion that motivated their investigation in the first place. This
provides evidence for the claim that Haag’s local commutivity is not moti-
vated and instead it is simply asserted. The purpose of the inaugural paper
was not to motivate each axiom, but to present reasonable mathematical
implementations of physically reasonable assertions and show that the re-
sults are interesting. My purpose all along has been to assess whether or not
microcausality is a physically reasonable assertion. That microcausality can
be found quietly embedded within the fundamental principle that inspired
Haag and Kastler’s axiomatic project is a strong indication that it might not
6This assumption, while not itself trivial, is often made without statement in the
literature I have examined. I have avoided tackling it simply because I am intentionally
avoiding notions of ‘causality’.
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be appropriately motivated.
After summarizing the Wightman axioms Haag remarked, that “We re-
gard [the axioms] as well as subsequent modifications and further structural
assumptions as working hypotheses rather than as rigid axioms” [Haag, 60,
1992] The axioms, as originally postulated, are to be regarded as provisional,
and some of the assumptions “... should be replaced by more natural ones
as deeper insight is gained” [Haag, 60, 1992]. This provides further evidence
that the axiom of microcausality, as presented originally, was not well mo-
tivated. The motivation behind the axiom was secondary to the project of
getting AQFT off the ground. Now that the consequences of the axiom are
better understood a project such as this one is worthwhile to ensure that the
axiom still stands. Furthermore, we should not be surprised that a strong a
motivation is not presented when the axiom was first postulated.
Haag and Kastler’s motivation for postulating the axiom of microcausal-
ity is not sufficient to preserve the axiom beyond the early stages of the
project. The motivation lacks mathematical rigour and it assumes that
space-like separated regions are necessarily causally disjoint. Furthermore, it
ignores other possible axioms that could secure the minimum requirements of
compatibility just as well as microcausality and was ultimately provisional.
The next section evaluates the relativity of simultaneity and hyperplane de-
pendent interpretations of quantum field theory as motivations by examining
the relationship between the axiom of interest and these features of space-
time.
2.5 Relativity of Simultaneity and Hyperplane De-
pendence
Microcausality suggests a form of causal shielding, and the insistence
that this is a relativistic phenomenon is (at least partially) an appeal to
the locality conditions apparently entailed by the theory of special relativity.
The locality implied by SR can be attributed to the relativity of simultaneity.
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In SR, if two regions of space-time (U1 and U2) are space-like separated then
events that occur in one region (A1) are outside of the forward and backward
light cones of events in the other (B2). In accordance with the relativity of
simultaneity there are reference frames from which it appears that A1 and
B2 occur simultaneously, A1 occurs before B2 and in which B2 occurs prior
to A1.
On the other hand, if the regions in question were time-like separated
(as opposed to space-like separated) then events in those regions would be
contained within each other’s light cones. In this case there is no frame of
reference from which these events appear to occur simultaneously. In fact,
the ordering of such events are fixed in all reference frames. Anything in
the backwards light cone of an event is said to be in its absolute past and
anything located in the forward light cone of an event is said to be in its
absolute future.
That microcausality applies only to space-like separated regions is also
an indication that its motivation might be found in the requirement of hy-
perplane independence7. Unfortunately, as the discussion on superluminal
signalling previously revealed, microcausality isn’t strong enough to forbid
all influences from occurring at space-like separation. On the other hand,
perhaps microcausality can be described as a minimal requirement for pre-
serving the relativity of simultaneity. After all, the relativity of simultaneity
minimally requires the order of space-like separated events to be independent
and the standard interpretation of microcausality is just that: the order that
the operations are performed in does not matter (to speak operationally).
In the special theory of relativity, the relativity of simultaneity is derived
from other properties and assumptions. If the relativity of simultaneity is
going to serve as a motivation for an axiom in QFT then we should investi-
gate the postulates which support the relativity of simultaneity. Section 2.1
showed that Lorentz covariance is secured by the Covariance axiom and so
we turn to the principle of relativity.
Recall Einstein’s explication of the principle of relativity: “If two coor-
7A hyperplane of simultaneity is a fixed time slice of space-time. Choosing a hyperplane
of simultaneity is equivalent to choosing an inertial frame of reference.
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dinate systems are in uniform parallel translational motion relative to each
other, the laws according to which the states of a physical system change
do not depend on which of the two systems these changes are related to.”
[Einstein, 1905. From Brown, 74, 2005]. This is often summarized into a pro-
hibition against frame preferencing. The first thing to settle is what exactly
the principle of relativity should prohibit privileging. Is it merely restricting
the ability to determine if your frame is moving solely by performing exper-
iments within that frame? Does it require that the outcomes of experiments
are independent from the frame of reference? Is it the prohibition against
observational or theoretical distinguishability of reference frames?
The principle of relativity is, at the very least, more than just a re-
quirement for covariance. Physically, the relativity principle postulated by
Einstein, requires any laws of physics that hold in a given reference frame to
hold just as well in another frame that is moving uniformly relative to the
first [Brown, 74, 2005]. Generalizing this principle, we might say that the
fundamental laws of physics are the same in an arbitrary (inertial) frame of
reference. This entails that one cannot determine, by an experiment solely
contained within a given frame of reference, whether the frame is moving or
at rest.
The next question to settle is at what level the principle applies. If
the principle is observationally oriented then we would be able to prefer
frames while still satisfying the principle, as long as that preferencing was not
observationally detectable. On the other hand, if the principle of relativity
must be upheld theoretically then we can never prefer a frame of reference
over another, even if is impossible to detect or determine which frame is
being privileged in a particular case.
Using an example from ordinary quantum mechanics it is straightforward
to illustrate the subtle yet important distinction between the theoretical and
observational levels. The collapse postulate of ordinary quantum mechanics
is responsible for many counter-intuitive results and interpretive challenges.
One common response to these results is to reject the collapse postulate.
Interpretations of OQM that do this are collectively referred to as no-collapse
interpretations. Two popular no-collapse theories are Bohmian Mechanics
47
and Many Worlds. Both interpretations reject the collapse postulate and
treat the wave function as a carrier of ontological content, but each treats
the formalism of OQM at a different level.
Bohmian mechanics requires quantum predictions to be upheld at an
observational level. The statistics of experiments and measurement out-
comes are required to correlate with those predicted by the formalism. How-
ever, beneath the stochastic shell is a deterministic core in which a pilot
wave deterministically guides the quantum particles along their apparently
stochastic trajectories. Observationally, quantum mechanics is correct. At
a more fundamental theoretical level something more subtle and distinctly
less ‘quantum’ is going on. According to Bohmian Mechanics particles have
definite positions at all times.
The many worlds interpretation also rejects the collapse postulate and
privileges the wave function but does so in a way that requires the quantum
formalism to be theoretically correct. For believers of this interpretation
the world splits into many distinct worlds whenever a quantum experiment
occurs such that each possible outcome obtains. On this theory the universe
fundamentally behaves in a way that is accurately described by the quantum
mechanical formalism. On the Many Worlds account particles only have
definite properties (such as position) immediately after measurement, which
is precisely what the formalism asserts and no more.
Both Bohmian Mechanics and Many Worlds are consistent with the re-
sults of quantum mechanics, and both are fundamentally deterministic no-
collapse theories that treat the wave function as having ontological value.
Bohmian Mechanics requires the outcome probabilities encoded in the wave
function to be upheld at an observational level and no deeper. Theoretically,
in the Bohmian picture, if you could determine the pilot wave and the exact
positions of the particles, you would know with certainty the outcome of an
experiment. Many Worlds requires the outcome probabilities to be upheld
at a theoretical level, which necessitates the postulation of infinitely many
worlds such that all possible outcomes obtain.
The theoretical level includes the observational level. If a principle must
be upheld theoretically then it is also, by necessity, observationally satisfied.
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The inverse is not true. The observational level permits a principle to be
violated as long as that violation is not ‘observable’. This is the case on the
Bohmian Mechanics interpretation. Observationally, the quantum formalism
is correct. Theoretically, however, particles have definite positions. Whether
or not the principle of relativity is an observational or theoretical demand
determines how strict our theory must adhere to the principle, which in turn
affects the implications of the relativity of simultaneity.
Whether or not the principle of relativity requires experimental (or event)
outcomes to be independent of observational frame may at first, to our New-
tonian intuitions, seem obvious. After all, if event outcomes are not frame
independent then it would seem to be possible that a particular electron
could be in two distinct, incompatible, states (up spin and down spin, for
example) depending on which frame of reference you happened to observe a
measurement on the electron with respect to. This is simplifying the matter
too much. Furthermore, if the success of quantum mechanics has taught us
anything it should be that our intuitions formed from experience break down
at the quantum level.
As an alternative approach to sorting out the connections between mi-
crocausality and the principle of relativity, consider the rejection of hyper-
plane independence. One such theory utilizes the Newton-Wigner localiza-
tion scheme and is advocated for by Gordon Fleming. The state of a quantum
particle, on this interpretation, depends on the hyperplane that the particle
is examined from. It only makes sense to discuss properties of systems when
the hyperplane under consideration is also explicitly stated. For example,
‘what is the polarization state of this photon?’ is an incomplete question.
Instead you need to ask, ‘what is the polarization state of this photon on
this particular hyperplane?’ [Maudlin, 208-212, 1994].
Localization refers to the way in which we define objects or systems to
be contained within a finite region. The goal of a localization scheme is to
appropriately tie operations to regions of spacetime. The standard way to
localize operations is via the Reeh-Schlieder theorem. Roughly, the standard
localization scheme defines a state ψ to be localized to a particular region
R if ψ is measurable within R. Given this definition of localization the
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Reeh-Schlieder theorem shows that for any net of local observables satisfying
the axioms of Isotony, Covariance and Weak Additivity, the vacuum state
is cyclic [Halvorson, 2000]. The cyclicity of the vacuum state has a few
counter-intuitive implications; most notably this result allows any state on a
Minkowski spacetime to be be approximated by measurements on its vacuum
state [Ruetsche, 2010]. Thus, one can approximate the entire vector space
of space-time by performing a single operation on a localized region of the
vacuum [Halvorson, 2000].
The argument against the Reeh-Schlieder localization scheme leverages
this (and other) counter-intuitive results that follow from the theorem to con-
clude that it violates the ‘spirit of relativistic causality’. Although Halvorson
notes that “... once one makes the crucial distinction between selective and
nonselective local operations, local cyclicity does not obviously conflict with
relativistic causality” [Halvorson, 2000], proponents of alternate localization
schemes continue to accuse the Reeh-Schlieder theorem of violating the spirit
of causality.
On the other hand we have the Newton-Wigner localization scheme which
was developed in part to side-step the (undesirable) consequences of the
Reeh-Schlieder theorem. To paraphrase Fleming and Butterfield, one could
define Newton-Wigner localization as follows:
If ψ is a state that is localized in region R and ψ1 is another
state that is localized in region R1, which is disjoint from region
R, then the vectors which correspond to these states in a given
reference frame must be orthogonal [Fleming and Butterfield,
1999, 113].
Fleming’s hyperplane dependent account of quantum field theory is built
upon this definition of localization.
The Newton-Wigner representation is, at least partially, motivated by a
desire to avoid the consequences of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem and still tie
operations to localized regions in an appropriate manner. The approach used
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by the Newton-Wigner localization scheme is the same localization scheme
found in ordinary quantum mechanics [Halvorson, 14, 2000].
One reason for Halvorson’s insistence that the Newton-Wigner represen-
tation fails to side step the odd implications of Reeh-Schlieder is its failure
to satisfy microcausality. He then shows that, because the Newton-Wigner
localization does not satisfy microcausality, it equivocates on distinct notions
of localization. Subsequently, this leaves us without an adequate or sensible
way to interpret what it means to localize a region or operation [Halvorson,
2000].
Here we may have stumbled upon a motivation for microcausality. By
Halvorson’s argument it seems that the axiom of microcausality plays a cru-
cial role in distinguishing notions of localization. On Halvorson’s interpreta-
tion, Fleming wants to discuss localized properties without leaning on notions
of ‘measurable within a specific region’. The problem then becomes a matter
of expressing how a property contained within a region can be distinct from
what is measurable within a region. Microcausality motivates Halvorson’s
concern. Operationally, it deals with localization (in the sense that space-
like separated regions are localized) via the notion of ‘measurable within’ and
without microcausality the Newton-Wigner representation risks permitting
causal anomalies [Halvorson, 2000].
Halvorson shows that one can construct specific examples of systems
which are localized in the Newton-Wigner sense but violate the axiom of
microcausality. Since Newton-Wigner localized regions do not require the
observables localized in space-like separated regions to commute, it is impos-
sible to interpret the localized states as ‘measurable within’ the regions that
they are local to. If one did try to interpret the states as measurable within
the regions then the failure of microcausality would permit causal anoma-
lies. In the operationalist language, this would mean that the statistics of
experiments in one localized region would affect the outcome of measure-
ments in a disjoint (space-like separated) region. Fleming, Halvorson notes,
is not without recourse at this stage since his project focuses on the notion
of localized properties and not states [Fleming, 2004].
How can a property be localized if it is not measurable (within) the region
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it is local to. Halvorson attempts to tease apart the notions of localized
properties and measurability within a region to no avail. He does so via an
analogy to classical mechanics. He notes two distinct localization concepts
encountered there: fixedly-localized (or f-localized) quantities occur when a
physical quantity is attached to a point in space (such as a magnetic field of
given strength) and variable-localized (or v-localized) quantities occur when
a quantity takes “... vectors in physical space as their values” (such as the
centre of mass of a spatially extended body) [Halvorson, 23, 2000].
It is easy to imagine v-localized quantities that are both localized to a
region and yet not measurable within that region. The centre of mass of a
large body is an example of such a quantity. However, since the assignment of
v-localized quantities is permanent to a particular region it does not grant us
any leeway in thinking about Newton-Wigner localized states, which are not
permanently attached to their region of localization [Halvorson, 23, 2000].
There are no examples of f-localized quantities which are both localized
in a region and not measurable within that region. Halvorson shows this by
example, but the argument can be made generally. As soon as you demand
that a quantity is not measurable in a region it ceases to be f-localized in
that region. This is because f-localization requires a quantity to be attached
to a particular point in space. A physical quantity that is f-localized in
a particular region is, by definition, measurable within that region. Since
f-localized quantities are the classical analog of Newton-Wigner localized
‘properties’ and it is not clear what it would mean for a quantity to be f-
localized in R but not measurable within R, we must conclude that it is not
clear how we should interpret the localization map provided by the Newton-
Wigner scheme [Halvorson, 23, 2000]. This result only followed because the
Newton-Wigner localization scheme does not satisfy microcausality.
Halvorson’s argument is not without fault. It is an operationalist mis-
take to assume that for something to be a property it must be measurable.
Operationally such a claim is obvious; a property is so because it is captured
by a particular measurement process. This is not a physical requirement,
merely a theoretical (and indeed, interpretive) one. Nothing in physics (or
the universe) blocks the possibility of there existing non-measurable proper-
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ties8.
Fleming’s reply is to reject microcausality using the same kind of ar-
gument that Halvorson invokes against the hyperplane dependent interpre-
tation, by rendering the definition ‘measurable within’ devoid of reference
[Fleming, 32, 2004]. When discussing Halvorson’s position Fleming notes
that “[the principle of microcausality] is, in turn, justified via the insistence
... that the concept of ‘being localized within a region ∆’ receives its mean-
ing from the supposed more primitive concept of ‘being measurable within
a region ∆” ’ [Fleming, 28, 2004].
Halvorson derives the concept of ‘localizable within’ from that of ‘mea-
surable within’ when defining universal microcausality and Fleming rejects
this inference. By utilizing Halvorson (and Clifton’s) own claim that “...
no object is strictly localized in a bounded region of space” [Halvorson and
Clifton, 20, 2002], Fleming’s argument follows: “... if there are no strictly
localizable objects, then there are no strictly localizable measuring
instruments. Furthermore, there are no strictly localizable parts of
measuring instruments that could be regarded as objects in their
own right” [Fleming, 32, 2004, emphasis in original]. From here it is clear
to see that the notion of ‘measurable within’ cannot provide grounding for
the concept of ‘localizable within’ since the idea of localizable measuring in-
strument is rendered absurd. Subsequently, the principle of microcausality
(as Halvorson presents it) now stands without support as Halvorson’s argu-
ment in favour of the axiom depends critically on the link between these two
concepts.
Fleming’s argument relies on the prior stated assumption that, since a
measurement apparatus is extended in space outside of the region which it
is used to investigate, then just because two regions are space-like separated
doesn’t entail that the measurement apparatus used to investigate those re-
gions are. This assumption assumes that measuring devices are not already
taken into account when ascribing the property of space-like separation to
two regions. Furthermore, the regression argument from ‘non localizable
8Such properties would be of little interest if they did not also have some influence on
the measurable properties of the world.
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measuring device’ to ‘nothing is localizable’ fails to appreciate that all mea-
surements inevitably do have an end point. Even on a primitive operational
interpretation, the observer reading the output from a display is the end
point of the regress.
Microcausality is the axiom dividing these two localization schemes. With
it, the standard scheme and the Reeh-Schlieder theorem are victorious and
without it the Newton-Wigner localization scheme has no meaningful opposi-
tion. Halvorson leverages microcausality to reject the hyperplane dependent
Newton-Wigner representation and the response by Fleming is to reject mi-
crocausality. The key player in this debate is the axiom itself, and on its
status hangs the fate of hyperplane dependence. If one is inclined to sup-
port hyperplane independence then postulating microcausality would be a
favourable position.
The rejection of hyperplane dependence would be an adequate motiva-
tional foundation for microcausality if we knew for certain that hyperplane
dependence fails to describe the world. As long as it remains possible that
there are preferred hyperplanes of simultaneity it also remains possible that
microcausality is in error. The bigger question here, that determines if a mo-
tivation for microcausality can be found in the relativity of simultaneity, is if
QFTs should be hyperplane dependent or independent. Furthermore, if it is
to be a hyperplane dependent theory then the sense of dependence needs to
be determined. At the very least, it must be determined if the dependence is
at the observational or theoretical level. If QFT is hyperplane dependent at
the theoretical level then the arguments surrounding the Newton-Wigner lo-
calization scheme indicate that there is no room for microcausality in such a
QFT. If it is merely observationally dependent then there might yet be room
to preserve microcausality, depending on the nature of the hyperplane de-
pendence. Either way, since microcausality is the key player in the debate on
hyperplane dependence, before utilizing this debate to motivate postulating
microcausality we ought to settle the status of hyperplane dependence.
Hyperplane dependence and independence both fail to motivate micro-
causality. Of course, we might find a foot hold for microcausality in its
relation to the primitive implications of the relativity of simultaneity and
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its usefulness in securing the role of hyperplane independence. In the next
section I will investigate a motivation rooted in ordinary quantum mechanics.
2.6 Tensor Product Motivations
Having discussed a variety of motivations founded in the special theory
of relativity, let us briefly consider one that is instead inspired by ordinary
quantum mechanics. Ruetsche presents this motivation as follows; “... as-
suming that O and O′ are different systems each with its own C∗-algebra,
we represent their union by a tensor product of those algebras; elements of
different components of a tensor product algebra commute” [Ruetsche, 112,
2011]. This is a process borrowed from ordinary quantum mechanics, where
distinct systems are represented as tensor products. Halvorson compactly
describes how the tensor product structure works in ordinary quantum me-
chanics:
“Despite the fact that non-relativistic QM makes no reference
to spacetime, it has a footprint of the relativistic prohibition of
superluminal signalling. In particular, that state space of two
distinct objects is a tensor product H1 ⊗ H2 , and their joint
algebra of observables is B(H1)⊗B(H2). In this tensor product
construction we represent observables for system A as simple
tensors a⊗ I and observables of system B as I⊗b. Thus, we have
a version of microcausality.” [Halvorson, 25, 2006]
It seems odd to prescribe any sort of relativistic ‘footprint’ to quantum me-
chanics. The role of the tensor product structure in quantum mechanics
is as a way to separate distinct systems. Classifying this as a version of
microcausality makes the assumption that space-like separated systems are
distinct, an assumption challenged in ordinary quantum mechanics by the
violation of Bell’s inequality, which, as we know from section 2.3, permits
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correlations at space-like separation. If systems at space-like separation are
distinct in some sense, that sense needs to be made explicit for this assump-
tion to be grounded at all.
Recall that kinematic independence requires any two observables rep-
resented by C*-algebras to commute [Summers, 202, 1990]. After defining
kinematic independence Summers draws a connection between commutation
and coexistence, establishing that when two observables commute they can
be said to coexist (in the rough and ready operationalist sense of simultane-
ously measurable) [Summers, 203-204]9. The commutation properties that
follow from the use of the tensor product structure entail a kind of kinematic
independence between distinct systems10.
Returning to Ruetsche’s proposed motivation, reason must be provided
for utilizing the tensor product structure (instead of something else) to de-
scribe distinct systems. The answer very well may be ‘no superluminal cau-
sation’ (or no ‘action-at-a-distance’), which leaves the position subject to the
same fate as superluminal signalling, which was left wanting in section 2.3.
The problems with this motivation arise before one even reaches the argu-
ments roots in special relativistic features. A defender of this position will
have to contend with more immediate and more pressing issues of circularity
and motivational strength.
In explicating the tensor product position the definition of ‘distinct sys-
tem’ is vital to the success (or failure) of the project. If spacelike separated
systems are equivocated with distinct systems the position runs afoul of cir-
cularity. The position would roughly read like this:
Since we use the tensor product structure to describe distinct systems
and spacelike separated systems are distinct then we would use it to describe
9The connection between coexistence and commutation only applies to observables
which can be represented by projection operators. This restriction has been dropped here
for simplicity.
10 Note that Summer shows that kinematic independence is logically independent from
statistical independence, so any conclusions drawn in section 2.2 are not applicable to the
tensor product motivation [Summers, Section II, 1990].
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spacelike separated systems. Systems described by the tensor product struc-
ture have commuting observables. But why do we use the tensor product
structure for distinct systems? Because distinct systems are non-interacting
and their observables ought to commute. Which is a circular position.
Microcausality is motivated by the use of tensor product structure to
describe spacelike separated systems, which is a mathematical entailment
and so we need a physical reason for applying that structure. The use of
the tensor product structure is motivated by physical reasons that can be
traced to an argument in favour of or an explication of microcausality. There
may be other physical motivations for using the tensor product structure to
describe distinct systems.
Even if we ignore the possible circularity of the argument, the tensor
product structure cannot be used to motivate postulating microcausality.
The tensor product structure implies stronger independence properties than
mere mutual commutation. Microcausality is just mutual commutation be-
tween space-like separated systems, but a tensor product structure also en-
tails the following result: for every ψ ∈ A and µ ∈ B there exists a τ ∈ A⊗B
such that τ |A= ψ and τ |B= µ [Halvorson, 25-26, 2006]. Microcausality
cannot be motivated by the use of the tensor product structure because the
tensor product is a stronger property.
If microcausality was to be motivated by the use of tensor product struc-
ture then we should postulate the use of the tensor product structure for dis-
tinct systems instead of postulating microcausality. If space-like separated
systems are also distinct then such a postulate would secure everything mi-
crocausality is intended to secure and more. Of course, this would require
a clear definition of ‘distinct system’ and assumes that we desire a stronger
axiomatic framework over minimalistic axioms (which is also not certain)11.
Either way, the use of tensor products to describe distinct systems cannot
11 Additionally, it is possible that the weaker axiom of microcausality is independent
of the other axioms while the stronger tensor product structure is not. Since I am not
considering the axioms as a set, I will not endeavour to settle whether the tensor product
structure could (or should) replace microcausality as an axiom of QFT.
57
serve as grounds for postulating microcausality.
2.7 The Fate of Microcausality
An axiom for a physical theory cannot be arbitrary. It must be motivated
and its motivation must be, at least partially, rooted in physical arguments.
Although some of the motivation for pursuing algebraic quantum field theory
is the mathematical rigour, an axiom cannot be purely mathematical and
cannot be motivated by its tendency to make our lives (either mathematically
or theoretically) easier. The axiom, and its implications, must be true12
and the physical arguments deployed to motivate the axiom must do so
appropriately.
With regards to the axiom of microcausality I have broken down the
relevant requirements of the special theory relativity and considered each
in turn as a motivation for postulating the axiom. Lorentz covariance is
already covered by the Covariance axiom. Independence properties, which
microcausality can be cast as one of, are nice properties but are not ap-
propriately related to microcausality to justify its postulation. While pos-
tulating microcausality fosters a mathematically closer relationship between
independence properties, these relationships are not a physical requirement.
No- signalling theorems that require microcausality are not comprehensive
enough to permit ‘prohibition against superluminal signalling’ from motivat-
ing the axiom. Likewise for separability which is a weakening of standard
no- signalling results and so falls to the same line of argument. Haag and
Kastler’s original motivation lacked rigour, and rightly so since Haag viewed
the axioms as provisional. The use of hyperplane independence to motivate
microcausality hinges on the outcome of the debate about whether or not
hyperplane dependence is a feature of the world. Finally, the tensor product
12In the case of QFT, approximately true. How true an axiom for a physical theory
known to be inadequate, such as QFT, can be is an interesting question but not one to
be addressed here. QFT is inadequate because it utilizes the special theory of relativity
which is made obsolete by the general theory of relativity.
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structure is a mathematically stronger property than microcausality and so
cannot be leveraged for motivation.
While each possible avenue of motivation failed on its own, for its own
reasons, to provide adequate grounds for postulating an axiom, they could
be joined together to form a stronger motivational story. From each con-
sidered motivation we can find a small reason to postulate microcausality.
From the above investigations we know that microcausality implies nice rela-
tionships between statistical independence properties, is utilized in theorems
that prohibit the most worrying cases of superluminal signalling, secures the
independence of hyperplanes of simultaneity and captures the basic demands
of the relativity of simultaneity. However, the problems with these motiva-
tions individually are not washed out in their union.
The compound motivation only gets off the ground if the entailments of
microcausality are actually true. This motivation assumes that statistical
independence properties are related in the way microcausality causes them
to be and that hyperplanes ought to be independent in the sense that micro-
causality permits. The debate surrounding the Newton-Wigner localization
scheme illustrates that there is still room in QFT for hyperplane dependence,
casting a shadow of doubt over the compound motivation.
This review has not considered the axioms of quantum field theory as a
complete set, instead focussing on a single axiom in a vacuum. I have shown
that the axiom of microcausality is not well motivated on its own. What is
clear is that supporters of microcausality must do more than gesture towards
no- signalling results or the use of the tensor product structure as motivation
for postulating the axiom and dig deeper to find a more stable, rigorous and
justified foundation to stand the axiom on. There is still room for a good
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